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Abstract 
Does the advent of cyber-war require us to abandon the traditional ethical framework for 
thinking about the morality of warfare - just war theory - and develop principles specific to the 
unique nature of cyber-attacks? Or can just war theory still provide an appropriate basis for 
thinking through the ethical issues raised by cyber-weapons? This article explores these questions 
via the issue of whether a cyber-attack can constitute a casus belli. The first half of the paper 
critically engages with recent attempts to provide a new theory of just information warfare (JIW) 
that is supposedly better suited to the unique character of cyber war insofar as it is grounded the 
broader meta-ethical framework of information ethics (IE). Yet the paper argues that not only is 
JIW fundamentally unsuitable as a way of thinking about cyber-war, but (in the second half) that 
it is possible to develop a different account of how we can understand a cyber-attack as 
constituting a casus belli  in a way that is in keeping with traditional just war theory. In short, there 
is no need to reinvent just war theory for the digital age.  
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The bewildering pace of technological change has transformed what looked like science-fiction 
alarmism twenty years ago - the offensive use of computer technology to target other computer 
systems, infrastructures, networks, or personal devices - and raised it rapidly into a position of 
significant prominence in security and policy making circles. The discovery of the so-called 
Stuxnet worm in 2010 which destroyed several centrifuges at Iran's uranium enrichment facility 
in Natanz, the use of cyber attacks during the tensions between Russia and Georgia and Estonia 
in 2008 and 2007 respectively, and several other recent cyber incidents, have meant that anyone 
reflecting on the future of warfare in the twenty-first century needs to take seriously the presence 
and use of cyber weapons.1 The novelty of these weapons poses the question whether the advent 
of cyber war require us to abandon the traditional ethical framework for thinking about the 
morality of warfare - just war theory - and develop principles specific to the unique nature of 
cyber attacks. Or can existing just war theory, maybe suitably amended but without fundamental 
alteration, still provide an appropriate basis for thinking through the ethical issues raised by cyber 
weapons? 
 We can identify three broad schools of thought in response to this question. The first is 
sceptical either that the development of cyber weapons raises any novel ethical questions that are 
not already covered by existing just war theory or that cyber attacks ought to be understood 
under the paradigm of warfare in the first place. These 'sceptics' need not deny that cyber war 
represents a significant shift in contemporary warfare, they only dispute whether these 
developments are such that they raise any new ethical questions.2 The second school of thought 
                                                          
1 For a good survey of cyber conflict including Stuxnet and Russia's conflict with Georgia and Estonia, see Jason 
Healey (ed.), A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986-2012 (Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013). 
2 Roger Crisp, 'Cyberwarfare: No New Ethics Needed', http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2012/06/cyberwarfare-
no-new-ethics-needed/. Accessed 14/08/2017; Eric Gartzke, 'The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace 
Back Down to Earth' International Security, 38:2 (2013), pp. 41-73; Larry May, 'The Nature of War and the Idea of 
"Cyberwar"', in Jens David Ohlin, et al. (eds.), Cyberwar - Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford 
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consists of those we may call 'moderates' who accept that cyber war creates some interesting 
novel moral, philosophical, and legal questions, but believe that just war theory contains 
resources which can be expanded or amended in order to capture the ethical issues that the 
innovations of cyber war have generated.3 The final school, that of the 'radicals', offers a 
somewhat more far-reaching philosophical and ethical response. It believes that the questions 
posed by cyber war cannot be adequately addressed by traditional just war theory because this 
new 'domain' of warfare is so radically different from all forms of conflict which came before it 
that we find ourselves with a 'regulatory gap' that can only be bridged via a new meta-ethical 
framework of analysis.4 The old one, suitable though it may have been for nuclear weapons, 
tanks, jet fighters, and the like, is simply not appropriate for the age of cyber war. In the words 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
University Press, 2015), pp. 3-15; Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Hurst & Co.: London, 2013); Thomas 
Rid, 'Cyber War will not take place', Journal of Strategic Studies, 35:1 (2012), 5-32.  
3 See particularly George Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare: The Quest for Responsible Security in the Age of Digital Warfare 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). See also Edward T. Barrett, 'Reliable Old Wineskins: The Applicability of 
the Just War Tradition to Military Cyber Operations', Philosophy & Technology, 28:3 (2015), pp. 387-405; Edward T. 
Barrett, 'Warfare in a New Domain: The Ethics of Military Cyber-Operations' Journal of Military Ethics, 12:1 (2013), 
pp. 4-17; James Cook, 'Is there anything Morally Special about Cyberwar?' in Jens David Ohlin, et al. (eds.), Cyberwar 
- Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 16-36; James Cook, ''Cyberation' 
and Just War Doctrine: A Response to Randall Dipert', Journal of Military Ethics, 9:4 (2010), pp. 411-23; Dorothy E. 
Denning and Bradley J. Strawser, 'Moral Cyber Weapons', in Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo (eds.), The 
Ethics of Information Warfare  (Springer: London, 2014), pp. 85-103; Christopher J. Eberle, 'Just War and Cyberwar', 
Journal of Military Ethics, 12:1 (2013), pp. 54-67; Ryan Jenkins, 'Is Stuxnet Physical? Does it Matter?' Journal of Military 
Ethics, 12:1 (2013), pp. 68-79. The moderate school has its legal correlative, such as the authors of the Tallinn Manual 
which takes existing international law and norms surrounding jus ad bellum and jus in bello apply to cyber operations 
(Michael N. Schmitt, et al., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  
4 Ludovica Glorioso, 'Cyber Conflicts: Addressing the Regulatory Gap', Philosophy & Technology, 28:3 (2015), pp. 333-
8 
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of John Arquilla, in many ways the first person to anticipate the emergence of cyber warfare and 
its ethical implications, cyber war leaves 'just war theory in tatters'.5 
 There is something admittedly paradoxical-sounding about the moderate position and 
intuitive in that of the radicals. After all, the advent of cyber weapons surely represents a 
revolutionary development in our security environment and hence we should not expect ethical 
frameworks such as just war theory, developed in and for a pre-digital world, to apply in this new 
context. Yet that is what I wish to argue here. And I wish to do so via the jus ad bellum of just 
cause, which has been one of the central issues around which these debates have hitherto 
focused. If as Vitoria put it, 'There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely, 
a wrong received', does a cyber attack constitute a 'wrong received'?6 In particular, can a cyber 
attack properly be understood as an aggressive act? And how does our answer to that question 
then impinge on whether the use of a cyber weapon constitutes a casus belli? The sceptics tend to 
reject the notion that cyber attacks can be acts of aggression, preferring to see them as analogous 
to other acts that fall short of aggression such as embargoes or espionage.7 And if cyber attacks 
are not a form of aggression then they cannot be an act of war, and certainly not ones that are to 
be regulated either by the principles of just war theory or of international law (such as UN 
charter articles 2.4 or 51). No aggression, no casus belli. Most commentators, however, fall into 
                                                          
5 John Arquilla, 'Ethics and Information in Warfare' in Z. Khalizad et al. (eds.) The Changing Role of Information in 
Warfare (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1999), p. 394. See also John Arquilla, 'Twenty Years of Cyberwar', Journal 
of Military Ethics, 12:1 (2013), pp. 80-7; Bringsjord, S. and Licato, J. (2015) 'By Disanalogy, Cyberwarfare is Utterly 
New', Philosophy & Technology 28:3, 339-58; Selmer Bringsjord and John Licato, 'By Disanalogy, Cyberwarfare is 
Utterly New', Philosophy & Technology, 28:3 (2015), pp. 339-58; Randall Dipert, 'The Ethics of Cyberwarfare', Journal of 
Military Ethics, 9:4 (2010), pp. 384-410. 
6 Cited in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th Edition (Basic Group: New York, 2006), p. 62.  
7 May, 'The Nature of War and the Idea of "Cyberwar"'; Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place; Rid, 'Cyber War will not 
take place'.  
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one of the other two camps, believing either that cyber attacks can be understood as aggressive 
in terms that are straightforwardly consistent with the terms of just war theory (the moderates) 
or that cyber attacks are indeed aggressive but that to understand how and why we have to adopt 
a radically different meta-ethical framework (the radicals).  
 The strategy of this paper is to demonstrate the sufficiency of traditional just war theory 
in two stages. In the first half of the paper I analyse one of the most sophisticated and influential 
branches of the radical school approach that suggests just war theory needs to be 'merged' with a 
new and more pertinent meta-ethics: The information age needs an information ethics (IE), and 
it is only by re-thinking our most basic ontological and moral assumptions along these lines that 
we can develop an account of just war theory - just information war (JIW) - appropriate for 
regulating the ethical use of cyber weapons.8 I shall argue that JIW not only delivers inadequate 
answers to the questions that we need a theory of just war applied to cyber attacks to provide, 
more troublingly it is also unable to get a sufficient grasp on the questions that a theory should 
enable us to ask. Despite the professed novelties of cyber attacks and the temptation to think that 
conflict in the cyber realm might demand a new meta-ethics designed specifically to incorporate 
developments in ICTs, the lesson from this discussion will be that any adequate ethical theory 
for regulating even conflict in the cyber realm needs to retain what I shall call the 'human 
perspective'. In the second half of the paper I set out an account of what such a perspective 
could look like. I seek to demonstrate that of those ontological features of cyber attacks radicals 
take to be incompatible with traditional just war theory - that they are non-physical, target non-
humans and are non-violent - only the latter actually poses any sort of meaningful challenge. The 
remaining two are either descriptively dubious or turn out to be of little relevance to just war 
                                                          
8 Mariarosaria Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', Topoi, 35:1 (2016), pp.213-24; Mariarosaria Taddeo, 'Information 
Warfare and Just War Theory', in Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo (eds.), The Ethics of Information Warfare 
(Springer: London, 2014), pp. 123-38. 
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theory. Yet even the challenge of non-violence can be met quite straightforwardly by 
conceptualising the harm caused by cyber attacks in terms of harm caused to vital human 
interests through degrading the functionality of computer systems necessary to a country's 
critical infrastructure. And as such it is possible to conceive the possibility that even non-violent 
cyber attacks (for not all cyber attacks are non-violent) may, under certain conditions, represent a 
casus belli in a way that is largely in keeping with traditional just war theory. In short, there is no 
need to reinvent the just war wheel for the digital age. 
 
Information Ethics and Just War Theory 
It is a central contention of IE that addressing cyber attacks 'solely on the basis of JWT [just war 
theory] generates more ethical conundrums than it solves'.9 This is because JWT makes a series 
of ontological assumptions about the nature of war which are fundamentally incompatible with 
the character of cyber attacks. For our purposes we can identify three related characteristics of 
cyber attacks that each can then be used to identify corresponding shortcomings with JWT:10 
 
Non-physical - JWT focuses mainly on the use of (usually kinetic) force in the domain of physical 
objects. As Brian Orend puts it, 'the gold standard of casus belli is a kinetic physical attack'.11 
Cyber attacks take place in a non-physical or virtual domain involving non-physical or virtual 
                                                          
9 Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', p. 216. 
10 Ibid.; Dipert, 'The Ethics of Cyberwarfare'.  
11 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, 2nd ed. (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2013), p. 176. 
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entities (though they may have consequences for physical objects in the physical realm, which is 
the sense in which they can be transversal).12 
 
Non-human - JWT rests on an 'anthropocentric ontology' which prioritises respect for humans and 
their interests, rights, etc., and disregards all non-human entities. The target of cyber attacks are 
computer systems and the information or data contained within them.13  
 
Non-violent - JWT understands violence primarily in terms of injury caused to human beings or the 
destruction of physical objects. Yet not only is the harm that cyber attacks cause often to non-
physical, non-human entities (see above) but are also best conceived in terms of the (mal-
)functioning of computer systems which often leads to neither bloodshed nor physical destruction. 
They may include, for instance, the use of a virus or a DDOS attack capable of disrupting or 
denying enemy access to information which may cause severe damage to the opponent yet do not 
appear to resemble traditional forms of violence.14 Such losses of computer functionality will 
often be temporary and reversible following a cyber attack (e.g. full system functionality will likely 
be restored as soon as a DDoS attack is halted). 
                                                          
12 To be clear from the outset, one of the arguments I am going to make against JIW is that ontological questions 
regarding whether cyber attacks are physical or not are simply irrelevant to assessing whether they can constitute a 
casus belli. Hence, while there is a live debate about the issue of cyber attacks' (non-)physicality which are of interest 
in their own right they nevertheless do not undermine traditional JWT in the way advocates of the radical approach 
suggest. See Jenkins, 'Is Stuxnet Physical?'; George R. Lucas, 'Postmodern War', Journal of Military Ethics, 9:4 (2010), 
pp. 289-98. 
13 See also May, 'The Nature of War and the Idea of "Cyberwar"' 
14 See also Arquilla, 'Ethics and Information in Warfare'; Barrett, 'Warfare in a New Domain'; Dipert, 'The Ethics of 
Cyberwarfare'. 
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We can understand these characteristics as identifying the domain in which cyber attacks take 
place, the status of the entities involved in them, and the nature of the harm caused to those 
entities. Where JWT is concerned with violent acts (harm) against human beings (target) in the 
physical realm (domain), cyber attacks are non-violent acts against non-human entities in a non-
physical realm. Hence any appropriate ethical framework for thinking about cyber attacks must 
be able to incorporate their ontological particularities in a way that JWT supposedly cannot. 
 The motivation for developing an ethics of information stems from the broader thought 
that ICTs in general 'are re-ontologising the context in which ethical issues arise, and in doing so 
they not only transform old problems, but also invite us to explore afresh the foundations on 
which our ethical positions are based'.15 ICTs have fundamentally transformed the intrinsic 
nature of reality, blurring the divide between offline and online, notions of personal identity, 
space, time and history, as well as conceptions of moral agency and responsibility, and, crucially, 
the very criterion for existence (being). It is no longer something's immutability, nor its being 
potentially subject to perception that qualifies it for existence, but it's being something with 
which we can interact. 'To be is to be interactable'.16 And it is no longer only material objects 
with which we, as physical beings, can interact, but also with non-physical entities such as 
programmes, databases, music files, virtual avatars and assets, and so on, all of which are forms 
of information. 
                                                          
15 Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 56. 
16 Ibid., p. 10 
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 The trouble with our standard ethical theories is that they employ a level of analysis 
(LoA) that excludes these non-physical but nevertheless real entities.17 A LoA is a theoretical tool 
that we employ in order to focus on some aspects of a system and to ignore others, depending 
on the interests or goals of the observer. Imagine we are analysing a car: An engineer will likely 
focus on the car's aerodynamics, the efficiency of its parts, weight, material, and so on. A 
potential buyer of the same car may focus on its aesthetic appearance. Both the engineer and the 
buyer are focusing on the same car but they endorse different LoAs in order to pick out 
particular features of the system.18 The higher the LoA, the more features of the system it will 
incorporate. The lower the LoA, the less observables it will include. But which LoA we adopt, 
which perspective we employ, will depend on what features of the system are relevant to the 
purposes of any particular observation.  
 Many of our standard ethical theories employ androcentric, anthropocentric, or 
biocentric LoAs, for example, and in doing so are then unable to support an effective analysis of 
moral scenarios in which non-human informational entities are involved. Even atypical ethics, 
like animal or environmental ethics, are still biocentric and hence biased against what is 
inanimate, lifeless, intangible, abstract, engineered, artificial, synthetic or merely possible.19 They 
ascribe moral concern or value only to what we intuitively think of as alive or able to feel pain, 
and hence cannot account for the moral scenarios that involve non-human entities like corpses, 
historical artefacts, or works of art, or non-physical entities like past and future generations, 
ideas, software, viruses and data. From an anthropocentric LoA such entities can only have 
instrumental value at best. IE is committed to a LoA that interprets reality informationally. And 
                                                          
17 Ibid., ch. 3; Luciano Floridi, 'Information Ethics: Its Nature and Scope', in Jeroen Van Den Hoven and John 
Weckert (eds.), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 40-65; 
Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare'. 
18 Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', p. 215. 
19 Floridi, The Ethics of Information, p. 64 
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because everything that exists (including physical objects) can be understood in terms of being a 
discrete, self-contained, encapsulated package containing appropriate data structures (which 
constitute the nature of the entity) and a collection of operations, functions, or procedures 
activated by various interactions or stimuli, it is a LoA that encompasses and concerns the entire 
realm of reality - now re-described as the infosphere in order to emphasise its essentially 
informational nature.20 This is the highest  possible LoA because it seeks to include all entities 
that meet the minimum common characteristic to exist - being informational - and in doing so 
becomes synonymous with reality or Being itself.21 
 It is in this sense that IE is ontocentric: it focuses on what exists, not on the human or the 
biological (though it will include these insofar as they are informational entities). And it applies a 
principle of ontological equality to all existing entities (physical and non-physical) in which 
 
every informational entity, insofar as it is an expression of Being, has a dignity 
constituted by its mode of existence and essence ... This dignity prima facie 
deserves to be respected and hence may place moral claims on any interacting 
agent. It ought to contribute towards constraining and guiding her ethical 
decisions and behaviour, even if only initially and in an overridable way. This 
ontological equality principle means that any form of reality - that is ... any 
instance of information - simply for the fact of being what it is, enjoys an 
initial, overridable, minimal right to exist and develop in a way appropriate to 
its nature.22 
                                                          
20 Floridi, 'Information Ethics', p. 46 
21 Floridi, The Ethics of Information, p. 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 69 
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Once we adopt the information approach the entire universe and everything in it - physical and 
non-physical - becomes a potential centre of moral concern simply by virtue of their 
informational nature ('something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain'.23 If 
something exists, then it has a dignity that deserves respect. 
 This respect is substantiated in practice by recognising that any informational entity has a 
right to persist in its own status, that is, to continue being that sort of information24, and a right 
to flourish through improving and enriching its existence and essence.25 IE is patient-orientated 
insofar as it considers the morality of any action in relation to its effects on the particular 
informational entity that is the recipient of that action.26 More generally, however, moral 
approval or disapproval should also be based on how an action affects the well-being (the 
enrichment or impoverishment) of the whole infosphere.27 This is conceptualised in terms of 
entropy, though this is not to be thought of in the thermodynamic sense of the state of 
randomness or disorder in a physical system at the atomic level, but as indicating 'the decrease or 
decay of information leading to absence of form, pattern, differentiation, or content in the 
infosphere', specifically in terms either of destruction ('the complete annihilation of the entity in 
question, which ceases to exist') or corruption ('a form of pollution or depletion of some of the 
properties of the entity, which ceases to exist as that entity and begins to exist as a different 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 69 
24 Massimo Durante, 'Violence, Just Cyber War and Information', Philosophy & Technology, 28:3 (2015), pp. 369-85 
25 Floridi, 'Information Ethics', p. 48 
26 Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', p. 220. 
27 Floridi, The Ethics of Information, 70. 
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entity minus that properties that have been corrupted or eliminated').28 This notion of entropy 
enables IE to determine what is morally right or wrong with reference to four principles:29 
 
0. entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law) 
1. entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere 
2. entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere 
3. the flourishing of informational entities as well as the whole infosphere 
ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating, and enriching their properties 
 
That an action is to be judged according to how it affects the flourishing of the infosphere, with 
the blooming of the infosphere representing the ultimate good and its corruption or destruction 
the ultimate evil, makes IE an ecological form of meta-ethics. 
 As a meta-ethical position, IE can be and has been applied to an array of ethical issues, 
not all of which need to be related to ICTs, in order to generate moral understanding and 
practical guidance. When it comes to the question of the wrong caused by cyber attacks, IE 
answers that all information systems are possible moral patients that can suffer harm, and the 
morality of a cyber attack is to be assessed on the basis of its effects on the right of those entities 
to exist and flourish, as well as the general flourishing of the infosphere. Cyber attacks therefore 
fail to respect information's deserved dignity in being. Any entity (e.g. hacker or computer virus) 
that comes into conflict (causes entropy) with other entities such as software or an information 
system may lose its right to exist. Indeed, because evil is defined as an increase in the level of 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p 67. 
29 Ibid., p. 71; Floridi, 'Information Ethics', pp. 58-9; Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', p. 221; Taddeo, 
'Information Warfare and Just War Theory', p. 133. 
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entropy within the infosphere, it 'is the moral duty of the other inhabitants to remove such a 
malicious entity from the environment or at least impede it from perpetrating more evil'.30 From 
this we can derive the following condition of an information casus belli: 
 
I. Cyber war ought to be waged only against those entities that endanger or 
disrupt the well-being of the infosphere 
 
And then two further principles of jus ad bellum: 
 
II. Cyber war ought to be waged to preserve the well-being of the infosphere 
III. Cyber war ought not to be waged to promote the well-being of the 
infosphere.31 
 
The second principle limits the objectives of cyber war to repairing the damage done to the 
infosphere to the level prior to when the malicious entity began to increase entropy within it; the 
promotion of the well-being of the infosphere lies beyond the remit of a just cyber war (the third 
principle). In this sense we might think of these two principles as an extension of the condition 
of right intention.  
  
Against Just Information War Theory 
                                                          
30 Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare', p. 221. 
31 Ibid., p. 221; Taddeo, 'Information Warfare and Just War Theory', p. 134. 
14 
 
The advantage of JIW, according to its advocates, is that it is a meta-ethic with ontological 
assumptions consistent with the peculiar character of cyber attacks in contrast to traditional 
JWT. To recall, JWT is concerned with violent acts (harm) against human beings (target) in the 
physical realm (domain), whereas cyber attacks are non-violent acts against non-human entities 
in a non-physical realm. As we have seen, IE is a patient-oriented, ontocentric, and ecological meta-
ethics.32 That IE is ontocentric means that it can account for entities and actions that exist in 
non-physical and physical domains (and those, like cyber attacks, which might transverse the 
two). That IE is patient-oriented allows us to make sense of how non-human entities, including 
information, can be the subject of ethical concern. And that IE is an ecological meta-ethics 
provides a way of conceptualising the harm caused to all information entities. As such, IE 
provides a novel answer to the question posed earlier in the paper as to the nature of the wrong 
involved in a cyber attack: such actions harm the information entities that it targets, and in doing 
cause entropy in the infosphere.33 This explains both the nature of their 'wrongness' and, when 
worked up into an account of JIW, the grounds on which a cyber attack can constitute a casus 
belli. It is only legitimate to engage in cyber war when the infosphere is endangered or disrupted. 
This reaffirms the notion that a just war will be reactive, responding to prior acts and cannot 
itself be the first act of aggression, which is in keeping with the traditional just war theory notion 
of just cause (that the notion of 'endangering' is included in the principle would seem to 
legitimate pre-emptive attacks also, though I leave that to one-side here).  
 But this cannot be the whole story; we need more from an ethical framework for 
thinking about cyber warfare than this. Why? Because if we leave matters here then we are left 
with a theory that tells us only, in the words of one JIW advocate, that a disruptive act that 
damages, deteriorates, deletes or suppresses an information entity 'patently rises to the level of 
                                                          
32 Floridi, The Ethics of Information; Taddeo, 'Just Information Warfare'. 
33 Taddeo, 'Information Warfare and Just War Theory', p. 136. 
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warfare (for instance, when destroying or damaging a computing infrastructure)'.34. Any 
disruption to any informational entity is an act of aggression? This is either a dangerous or an 
absurd notion; likely both. But it is, for reasons I now want to set out, the position that a theory 
of just war merged with IE will necessarily be committed to.   
 Remember that all informational entities, by virtue of being, have a prima facie right to 
exist. All things being equal, a world in which a particular email or rock exists is preferable, even 
if only slightly so, to a world that is the same in all ways apart from the absence of that same 
email or rock because that world will be ontologically richer.35 The same will be true of all and 
any other informational entities. Likewise, all things again being equal, from the perspective of 
IE there is no relevant moral difference between different informational entities at the level of 
their right to exist (unless they are disrupting the infosphere, in which case they forfeit that 
right). This is the principle of ontological equality central to IE. So the loss of or disruption to 
any informational entities would seem to be an equal wrong. But this generates some very 
disturbing conclusions. Imagine a cyber attack which took the form of a virus that trawled 
through every computer network in the world, public and private, and systematically deleted 
every 'selfie' it can find. These pictures are information entities that have a dignity due to their 
existence which the creator of the virus has failed to respect. The number of selfies in existence 
is probably easily in the billions and hence the infosphere will be a significantly diminished place 
because of this virus. Now imagine a different virus that sought not to delete selfies but to delete 
or corrupt a single programme, though one that is absolutely essential to the functioning of a 
FRXQWU\·V major power grid. JIW tells us that the use of either virus would constitute a casus belli. 
 If that conclusion looks problematic, as it should, it is not hard to see why. There are 
other considerations that are essential to the question of whether something represents an act of 
                                                          
34 Durante, 'Violence, Just Cyber War and Information', p. 371. 
35 Floridi, The Ethics of Information, p. 131. 
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aggression or not, none of which JIW provides us with the resources to judge in any particular 
scenario. The first is the target of the attack. Though the alternative scenarios set up above 
purposefully differ in their severity, they draw attention to the fact that when assessing whether 
an attack represents a casus belli we need to be able to discriminate between the nature, value and 
significance of the target of those attacks in a way that is not possible from an informational 
perspective. Any action that diminishes the well-being of the infosphere makes the offender a 
legitimate target of a violent response. JIW does not and cannot because of the principle of ontological 
equality distinguish between different informational entities, a consequence of which must be that 
any cyber attack on any entity will unconditionally represent a just cause. But that is obviously 
outrageously permissive. We think, and rightly so, that there are some entities even the 
destruction of which would not justify a violent response; indeed we probably think the vast 
majority of entities that exist (physical and non-physical) would fall into this category. But such 
judgements cannot be made from the informational LoA where the principle of ontological 
equality gives all entities the same prima facie right to existence. So the mere 'disruption of the 
infosphere' cannot in itself constitute an act of aggression. And to think that it does is to offer no 
guidance as to when it is legitimate to go to war other than to say that only an aggressive act can 
provide the grounds for a just conflict. That much we already know.36 
 Even if we can identify a category of informational entities the targeting of which 
represents an act of aggression, we are still required to make judgements as to how disruptive or 
grave an attack is before we can judge whether it represents a casus belli. JIW tells us only that the 
                                                          
36 Another way of thinking about this deficiency with the IE account is via the condition of proportionality rather 
than just cause, as we are doing here. We might think that the reason why the virus that deletes selfies does not 
justify a violent response is because the principle of proportionality tells us that no armed attack could ever be a 
fitting response to such an inane act. That seems obviously right, but again it is unclear how this assessment can be 
made from the informational perspective as it requires us to make judgements as to the value and significance of the 
entities damaged in the attack which we can only do from a perspective other than of the infosphere.   
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disruption of the infosphere is sufficient cause for a just war. It says nothing about how 
significant that disruption has to be, regardless of what the target is. Surely there are some 
attacks, even on vital targets such as critical infrastructure, which are not significant enough to 
warrant or legitimate a violent response. DDoS attacks such as those launched against Estonia in 
2007 did target critical infrastructure, but the consensus (rightly) seems to be that though they 
were disruptive they nevertheless fell short of being aggressive, and are better characterised as 
either vandalism or criminal activities rather than acts of war.37 To be sure, and as Stuxnet has 
proven, cyber attacks can destroy objects in the physical world. We may find that these sort of 
destructive attacks are the exception more than the rule, yet they are possible, and the authors of 
the Tallinn Manual (largely) agreed that the Stuxnet worm did represent a casus belli; Iran would 
have been justified in retaliating.38 Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assume that a cyber 
attack may directly lead to human casualties in the future. Failure to take these considerations 
into account leave us unable to distinguish between different categories of action in the cyber 
realm which, as Lucas rightly points out, is an unfortunate trend in contemporary discussions. 
Too little attempt is often made to distinguish between cyber vandalism, cyber crime, cyber 
espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber war39, and part of how we make such distinctions is going 
to rely upon judgements as to the perceived severity of any harm caused. Questions of whether a 
cyber attack is an annoyance or a menace, an aggressive act or act of vandalism, are crucial for 
determining whether it can constitute a casus belli or not. And it is far from clear how JIW can 
allow us to make these judgements, again because of the sort of meta-ethical approach that IE is. 
Whereas the principle of ontological equality undermines our ability to discriminate between 
targets, as informational entities have an equal prima facie right to existence, when that is 
                                                          
37 Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare, p. 117; Schmitt, et. al., Tallinn Manual, p. 75. 
38 Schmitt, et al., Tallinn Manual, p. 58. See also Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare, pp. 117-8. 
39 George R. Lucas, 'Permissible Preventative Cyberwar: Restricting Cyber Conflict to Justified Military Targets', in 
Floridi and Taddeo (eds.) The Ethics of Information Warfare, pp. 73-83 
18 
 
combined with the commitment to being a patient-oriented meta-ethics then that necessarily 
draws our attention away from questions that we might otherwise deem morally pertinent to 
focus exclusively on the wrong done to that entity/patient. To adopt any other perspective, such as 
the indirect consequences of an attack on humans and their interests, is to have failed to treat the 
target entity as the victim of a moral wrong. 
 This relates to a third consideration, which in a certain sense ties the other two together 
also, and that is the apolitical nature of the JIW account. From the perspective of the infosphere 
what we see are only ontologically discrete informational entities. Hence it follows quite 
straightforwardly from JIW being an environmental meta-ethic that any entity which disrupts or 
endangers the well-being of the infosphere becomes a licit target, and that it becomes a moral 
duty for all other entities to prevent that licit entity from causing more evil.40 What JIW portrays 
is a world in which any entity can be declared war upon, properly speaking, and any entity can 
declare war. But this totally misses the necessarily political dimension of war. War is a 
relationship between groups of human beings, and specifically between political groups. We 
primarily think of these groups in terms of states, but the spread of irregular forms of warfare 
over recent decades which involve non-state actor complicates that picture. Nevertheless even 
insurgents or terrorists are understood as political in the sense of having and pursuing specifically 
political objectives through their actions. War is, in Clausewitz's famous remark, 'a mere 
continuation of policy by other means'. This maters because only an aggressive action by a 
political group can constitute a casus belli. A group pursuing financial gain via illegal cyber 
activities, for instance, could be the subject of legal proceedings, but that is not war (and it is 
important that it is not war). The same would be true of an individual hacker, even if he might be 
acting on or pursuing political ends (without direction from any government). Any perspective 
                                                          
40 Taddeo, 'Information Warfare and Just War Theory', p. 136. 
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which does not appreciate the specifically political dimension of warfare is therefore an 
inappropriate place from which to view the ethical problems of cyber war.41   
 All of this is supposed to lend credence to the thought that causing harm to the 
infosphere cannot, in itself, constitute a casus belli. It is not the case that any cyber attack will 
represent a just cause. In order to make appropriate judgements as to whether a cyber attack 
does constitute a casus belli there is no escaping the fact that we can only do so from a specifically 
human perspective or, to use the discourse of IE, a human LoA. This is because a judgement on 
the justness of a war is a judgement of human actions in relation to human interests and projects 
and with regard to future human consequences. While it might be possible to recast cyber attacks 
in terms of their entropic effects on the infosphere, it seems fairly clear that the judgements we 
can and do make, relatively unproblematically, about the wrong of cyber attacks relates directly to 
their effects on human interests. To provide an answer to the question of whether an act is 
aggressive or not we need to assess the content of the wrong inflicted by one political party on 
another, which itself requires accompanying judgements about the nature and relative 
importance of a large and complex set of specifically human needs, interests, values and purposes, 
as well as the extent of the harm or disruption that that act does to them. The justice of a war is 
a question asked by humans of specific human actions and their effects on a particular group of 
other human beings. A theory of just war needs to speak directly to that human question. 
 Stating that defending the well-being of the infosphere is a just reason to go to war is not 
an answer to the question we need an answer to. We need to know precisely which bits of the 
infosphere can justly attack which other bits, which political entities can justly wage war against 
which other political entities. And that means we need to identify quite clearly exactly what the 
                                                          
41 That JIW states we have a moral obligation to attack licit entities, rather than simply the right, is also a huge 
difference between it and traditional just war theory that would have momentous legal ramifications, and deserves 
much more attention than it is given in the literature.   
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nature of the wrong was, by whom to whom. To do that, the perspective from which we need to 
judge, assess, critique, and ultimately act is not and cannot be the perspective of the infosphere 
and its well-being, but our local and necessarily more limited human perspective of political 
groups, their actions, and their impact on our projects and purposes. War is by its very nature 
both a human activity and one that divides humans against each other, the purpose of which is 
to work out competing human claims through violence (to resources, values, interests, etc.). 
Judgements as to the justness of that violence must therefore remain tied to the human 
condition from which it arises. They cannot be, and we do not need them to be, judgements 
from the perspective of their effects on the infosphere. 
 
IE: Minimalism not Reductionism? Or, in favour of human ethics 
At this stage I may legitimately be accused of having mistaken IE's endorsement of a minimalist 
approach, insofar as it considers informational nature as the minimal common denominator 
among all existing things, for a crude reductionism: IE 'does not claim that the informational 
approach is the unique LoA from which moral discourse is addressed. Rather it maintains that 
the informational LoA provides a minimal starting point, which can then be enriched by 
considering other moral perspectives'.42 What IE tells us is that in considering ethical issues we 
must adopt whichever LoA is most appropriate, and that need not always be the highest level of 
abstraction, i.e. the informational perspective. For some issues, an anthropocentric LoA may 
indeed be more suitable. So, for instance, it is worth remembering that IE insists that all 
informational entities only have the prima facie right to exist, a right that can be overridden one 
assumes if we decide from whichever LoA we do adopt that particular entities are of greater 
moral significance. But if this is right it either makes IE redundant or uninteresting as a way of 
                                                          
42 Taddeo, 'Information Warfare and Just War Theory', p. 132 
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approaching cyber war. Or, put differently, my claim is not that IE is mistaken in taking the 
informational approach to be the 'unique' LoA from which to assess moral scenarios, but that it 
does not represent even a relevant 'minimal starting point' for making judgements of the sort 
that the ethical questions relating to the wrong of cyber attacks require. 
 There are two ways of getting at this point. The first is to insist that there is nothing 
illegitimate or ethically inappropriate about starting our moral reasoning directly from an 
anthropocentric LoA, that doing so does not represent some arbitrary bias or unjustified 
prejudice. This is to register a fairly fundamental disagreement with IE as a meta-ethic. The 
second is to deny that the informational LoA adds any morally relevant information to our 
reasoning regarding cyber war; everything that is needed to explain the wrong of cyber attacks is 
readily at hand in an anthropocentric LoA. The anthropocentric LoA is sufficient for our moral 
purposes. While these are strictly speaking independent claims insofar as neither implies or relies 
upon the other, I want to try and defend them both via a similar route. 
 In defending the move to an ontocentric LoA, Floridi tells us 'It seems that any attempt 
to exclude nonliving entities is based on some specific, low LoA and its corresponding 
observables, but that this is an arbitrary choice. In the scale of beings, there may be no good reasons 
to stop anywhere but at the bottom ... There seems to be no good reason not to adopt a higher 
and more inclusive, ontocentric LoA'.43 Everything here turns on what counts as a 'good reason'. 
Why not settle at the lower anthropocentric LoA? It is certainly the case that the thought that 
human beings occupy a position of absolute importance in the universe is no longer a plausible 
one that most of us can truthfully hold. But it is an error to think that because we cannot stop at 
anthropocentrism due to our moral significance from the point of view of the cosmos that we 
must therefore go straight to the 'bottom' and start our moral reasoning from the minimal 
condition of being, that to do otherwise would be simply arbitrary. The mistake is to think that 
                                                          
43 Floridi, 'Information Ethics', p. 56. Emphasis added. 
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there are only two ethical positions available to us: either human beings are of moral significance 
from some non-human perspective or they have no greater moral significance than any other 
entity that exists. While human beings, their interests, values and projects, are of no particular 
interest to the universe (or the infosphere), they are certainly of supreme significance to us. They 
are important from our perspective. Of course there is little surprising about that, after all it is 
human beings who ask ethical questions of their own activities, and it is with other human beings 
that we seek to discuss and explore these issues. Even when the question relates to our 
behaviour towards other non-human entities, it is still us who ask the questions and us who 
judge the adequacy of the answers. But that our own moral significance is a central feature of our 
ethical experience, and we know of no other (and even if we did, it is far from obvious how we 
would or should relate to it), is certainly a reason to think that it should be taken seriously in our 
moral thinking. To deny that this is a 'good enough' reason is to hanker for the sort of ultimate 
normative justification from some non-human perspective (God, Nature, Reason, Infosphere) 
that is no longer available to us, if it ever was.44 
 It is humans, and only humans, to whom ethical justifications for human acts have to be 
offered. The moral discourse we need is therefore one in which the features that we deem to be 
ethically relevant to assessing a cyber attack are readily at hand. This is precisely why traditional 
just war theory has tended towards a very minimal notion of what constitutes a casus belli. 
Whatever else we may disagree on, we readily recognise the harm caused by violent acts, and 
even if we think they are justified it is important that we acknowledge how they stand in need of 
justification in the first place. The difficulty with cyber attacks is that it is unclear if we can 
understand them as aggressive at all, as was noted earlier. That they are non-violent acts against 
non-human entities in a non-physical realm were perceived as reasons for needing to shift to a 
                                                          
44 I am indebted here to Bernard Williams's discussion in his 'The Human Prejudice' (in Adrian W. Moore (ed.), 
Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 135-52). 
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new meta-ethical framework in which cyber attacks can be understood as acts of aggression. But 
if we can show how there are sufficient resources for understanding cyber attacks as aggressive 
acts from within an anthropocentric LoA then any further ethical light that is shone on the issue 
from an informational perspective is ultimately superfluous, and hence the informational LoA 
does not provide even a 'minimal starting point' for our ethical reflection on cyber war. In fact, 
when it comes to the question of whether a cyber attack represents a just cause it can add 
nothing relevant to our reasoning that is not already present in the human perspective. Or so I 
now need to demonstrate.  
 
Cyber War from a Human Perspective  
As we have seen, advocates of IE insist that cyber attacks can only be included in a just war 
perspective if we adopt a new meta-ethical framework which endorses ontological commitments 
that can allow us to make sense of non-physical acts of non-violence against non-humans as 
nevertheless aggressive. So far I have argued that IE fails to provide an adequate framework for 
thinking about the possibility of a cyber casus belli. Yet that does not in itself prove that the 
'radicals' are wrong in thinking that there is a fundamental incompatibility between cyber attacks 
and JWT in the first place. They may still be right about that but only wrong in how they develop 
their alternative account of JIW. Hence if I want to defend a traditional JWT approach to 
thinking about cyber attacks then I need to show how those peculiarities of conflict in the cyber 
realm - that they are non-violent and non-physical attacks targeting non-humans - can be squared with 
its basic ontological assumptions. This is what I wish to do in this final section.  
 The issue of cyber attacks' non-physicality can be dealt with fairly quickly. While there is 
something intuitive in the thought that the cyber domain is not equivalent to the other domains 
of warfare - sea, air, land and space - this is not adequately captured by the sense that this is 
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because it is a non-physical realm. The weapons of cyber warriors - code - is physical at least in 
that it is made up of electrons, of physical matter with physical properties that obey the laws of 
physics. Likewise, the targets of cyber attacks, which can include programmes, databases, 
websites, and so on, are equally made up of code or information also which are not adequately 
conceptualised as non-physical. Digital information is a particular arrangement of matter and any 
change to a programme is a change to its underlying physical structure. Yet the claim about cyber 
attacks being non-physical is often elided with related but equally problematic claims, that they 
are non-kinetic or non-tangible for example. Certainly it is true that the damage cyber attacks can 
cause are not due to kinetic energy, yet chemical and biological weapons do not cause harm via 
kinetic force either but their use is nevertheless still very much an aggressive act. And I can no 
more touch code than I can a laser or a high-energy electromagnetic pulse, yet the weaponised 
use of either may plausibly be conceived of as act of aggression.  
 Regardless, however, of whether we ought to consider cyber attacks to be physical or 
not, we go wrong if we think that this question has much bearing on whether a cyber attack can 
constitute a casus belli. Even if it were the case that cyber attacks are non-physical (or non-tangible 
or non-kinetic, etc.) this fact would actually be completely irrelevant to the question of whether they 
can represent aggressive acts or not. That cyber attacks are acts within the cyber realm is 
certainly a novel characteristic which distinguishes it from other attacks. But the domain in 
which those attacks take place are no more relevant to the question of whether they can 
constitute a casus belli as the fact that naval warfare takes place at sea or that an aerial campaign 
takes place in the sky (or, indeed, that attacks in one domain might have consequences in 
another). And we can quite naturally intuit this if we consider that we would be highly unlikely to 
assess the destruction of a nuclear power plant any differently if it was due to a cyber weapon or 
an actual bomb. Even if we granted that the former is non-physical this seems to have little 
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bearing on our consideration that it would indeed, and just as with the use of a physical bomb, 
represent an act of war. The question of their physicality is simply an extraneous issue.   
 As for the issue that JWT is unable to accommodate the fact that cyber attacks target 
non-humans, this too seems both misguided and somewhat besides the point. The loss of human 
life might be a sufficient but it is not a necessary condition of a casus belli. Elaborating upon the 
above scenario, let us further imagine that while the cyber attack causes irreparable damage to 
the plant without harming a single person the conventional bomb both destroys the plant and 
causes numerous fatalities. There is no reason to think that the terms of just war theory are such 
that only the second scenario could constitute a casus belli. Insofar as the use of a cyber attack 
would presumably do indirect yet nevertheless significant damage to the interests of its citizens 
then it would still count as an aggressive act (a point we shall come on to shortly). Or consider 
an invasion by one state of an area of a neighbouring state which is devoid of occupants and 
completely lacking in cultural, financial, political or defensive value for its people. It would be 
hard to say that a single human being is harmed in such an invasion, yet we readily recognise that 
this would represent a violation of the state's sovereignty and hence legitimate an armed 
response. In short, there is nothing in JWT that insists that human bodies must be the direct 
target of an attack for it to justify retaliation. 
 This leaves the issue of cyber attacks being non-violent. Again there is reason to doubt 
that this is descriptively adequate. We know from Stuxnet that cyber attacks can potentially be 
physically destructive in ways that we traditionally associate with acts of aggression, and where 
any future cyber attacks reach that level of violence then we can fairly straightforwardly say that 
such an act would represent a casus belli. The only real question here is not would such attacks 
constitute a just cause but whether we can reasonably assume that the future of cyber conflicts 
will see the proliferation and use of Stuxnet-like weapons designed to cause physical damage or 
continue to be dominated by the largely disruptive attacks that have characterised most of the 
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cyber attacks that we have so far encountered.45 Either way, the relevant point for us is that cyber 
attacks can be violent in ways equivalent to the sort of violence traditional just war theory has 
hitherto been concerned with and, where that is the case, then we are able to assess such acts 
according to the same standards of aggression.  
 However, while it is possible to ground the idea of cyber casus belli in the same notions 
that ground our broader and more traditional accounts of casus belli it nevertheless remains the 
case that many of the cyber attacks that we have experienced to date have been non-violent 
insofar as they lead neither to physical destruction nor human injuries or fatalities. They were 
purely disruptive. Could such non-violent attacks still constitute a casus belli? The answer to this is 
that they can, though we require a better sense of how non-violent cyber attacks can still be 
harmful in morally significant ways such that they are acts of aggression. And to recognise this 
we do need to go beyond traditional just war theory and accept that aggressive acts can take non-
violent forms. 
 The way to get a handle on this is to consider both the nature of the computer systems 
cyber attacks target and the possible ramifications of those attacks. Remember that one problem 
we identified with an informational approach to cyber attacks is that it did not allow us to 
discriminate between the value or moral significance of different computer systems. An attack 
on any computer system seemed to legitimate a violent response. Clearly a somewhat more 
specific account of which targets are salient in this regard is required. What I want to suggest is 
that an attack can only rise to the level of a casus belli if it targets a state's computer systems 
necessary for the functioning of its critical infrastructure. This is not to deny that other computer 
systems can be the victim of a cyber attack; those of companies, universities, individuals, and so 
on, are regularly targeted. Rather, for the purposes of thinking about the legitimacy of an 
                                                          
45 See May, 'The Nature of War and the Idea of "Cyberwar"'.  
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aggressive response, only attacks on the computer systems of critical infrastructure are 
potentially significant enough to warrant such a reaction. How can we justify this focus? 
 Definitions of critical infrastructure vary across countries but are united by the thought 
that the relevant asset must be 'vital' in order to count as critical. So the US Department of 
Homeland Security states that 'Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and networks, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction 
would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof'.46 Likewise, the UK Government defines critical national 
infrastructure as 'Those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the 
continued delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or 
compromise of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.47 
While, therefore, any infrastructure sector (e.g. communications, emergency services, energy, 
finance, food, government, health, transport, water) will be made up of numerous assets, it is 
only those the loss of which would have 'severe' or 'debilitating' consequences in terms of 
economic, social or political disruption or the loss of human life that count as critical. This 
narrower definition is to be preferred to more expansive understanding of critical infrastructure 
as anything essential to the functioning of a society and economy, which then may, as a Chatham 
House report recently pointed out, raise questions as to whether the criticality of companies such 
as Google and Amazon to the functioning of a modern economy would also qualify them as 
critical infrastructure (Cornish, et al. 2011).48 
                                                          
46 http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure 
47 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62504/strategic-
framework.pdf 
48 Paul Cornish, et al., 'Cyber Security and the UK's Critical National Infrastructure', The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (Great Britain: Chatham House, 2011). 
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 Both the US and UK definitions acknowledge that there can be 'virtual' or 'electronic' 
critical infrastructure assets, the damage or disruption of which would lead to 'severe' or 
'debilitating' consequences. This infrastructure is considered critical because it is vital to the 
delivery of services necessary for securing and maintaining significant human interests in health, 
communication, energy, defence, order, and so on. Clearly only certain assets within a national 
infrastructure sector will be deemed critical depending on their function in providing those 
essential services and the potential consequences of their being disrupted. This allows for a 
certain amount of flexibility of judgement as to what counts as a critical infrastructure asset or 
not. It is also true that governments demarcate different infrastructure sectors (the US lists 16, 
the UK 9) but this reflects more the differing governmental structures of each country and the 
question of how departmental responsibility for each sector is appropriately allocated. It also 
speaks to the peculiarities of country's needs and vulnerabilities. The US, for instance, lists the 
dams sector as critical infrastructure because of how reliant they are on dams for the provision 
of hydro-electric power, river navigation, water supply flood control and waste management. The 
UK does not share such reliance and hence dams are listed only as a sub-sector of their water 
national infrastructure. But despite these variations, the point remains that critical infrastructure 
is identified with reference to their vital function in serving and realising significant human 
interests.  
 The focus on critical infrastructure and the disruption that cyber attacks can cause gives 
us a way of thinking in a quite straightforward and direct way about the potential harm those 
attacks might do. The 'wrong received' by a cyber attack lies in how disrupting the functionality 
of critical infrastructure has the potential to then (directly and/or indirectly) cause harm to the 
vital interests of human beings. And it is from this wrong that we are then able to make a 
judgement as to whether an attack constitutes a casus belli or not. Crucially, as opposed to the 
informational approach of IE, all this account needs in order to be both morally plausible and 
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theoretically sufficient is a general notion of which human interests have adequate moral 
significance alongside an empirical understanding of how critical infrastructure assets relate to 
those in particular contexts. Both of these features are readily available within an anthropocentric 
LoA. The former underpins many contemporary 'interest-based' theories of human rights which 
explicitly do not seek to ground those rights in anything extra-human such as reason or natural 
rights49, while the latter is a matter only of identifying the network of institutions and relations 
between particular assets and particular human interests.  
  Cyber attacks can take both violent and non-violent forms. Where they are violent JWT 
can assess whether they constitute a casus belli in exactly the same way as it would a more 
traditional attack. In this sense there is continuity between the typical grounds for considering an 
act of aggression a casus belli in JWT and what might constitute a cyber casus belli. A slightly 
different account is required for non-violent cyber attacks. If non-violent cyber attack reaches a 
significant enough level of disruption such that they harm vital human interests then at that point 
they may be considered a casus belli.  
 A few points deserve clarification or further development. First of all, it is important to 
note that this account leaves no moral remainder; there are no aspects of the wrong of a cyber 
attack that remains unexplained, unjustified, or mysterious to us. For example, a further question 
which has vexed some commentators, is whether a cyber attack can be considered aggressive 
when the damage that it causes to a computer system may be temporary or completely reversible. 
We can now see why this is a misplaced worry. That a computer system itself may return to full 
functionality following an attack proves to be of little consequence if what matters for the 
purpose of assessing whether it constitutes a casus belli or not is how, if at all, it harmed human 
interests. It may well be that a cyber attack permanently degrades the functionality of a computer 
system, but that is only relevant insofar as it means that the harm caused to human beings' 
                                                          
49 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
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interests is likely to be more profound than a brief attack where full functionality is quickly 
restored. Yet that need not always be true and we can imagine scenarios in which a brief or 
intermittent cyber attack may even prove more harmful than one which permanently disables a 
computer system. And so we go astray if we think that the question of the (im)permanence of 
the degradation to computer system functionality is central to how we conceptualise the 
aggressive nature of cyber attacks.50  
 It is important to recognise that while non-violent cyber attacks are aggressive insofar as 
they disrupt the functioning of critical infrastructure that are vital to securing and maintaining 
significant human interests, whether a cyber attacks represent a casus belli is a judgement that can 
only be made in relation to the consequences, potential and actual, of the attack on those 
interests. The conclusion of this argument is that cyber attacks (violent and non-violent) can 
represent a just cause, not that they necessarily do. The actual disruptive capacity of cyber attacks 
even on critical infrastructure is going to vary wildly. Some may cause very little disruption at all, 
either in terms of the duration of the attack or how it undermines the capacity of that 
infrastructure to function adequately, and hence be best thought of as a nuisance. Where that is 
the case, as may be true with most DDoS attacks, we are less likely to judge that such attacks 
                                                          
50 This helps shed some light on exactly where advocates of the radical school go fundamentally wrong in their 
analysis. Firstly, they wrongly assume that cyber attacks cannot be violent in ways we would familiarly recognise as 
such. Stuxnet should be evidence enough that this is false. But, more importantly, they are simply wrong in thinking 
that because a cyber attack targets computer systems that we must account for the relevant harm in terms of damage 
to those systems, and hence need to create a new ethical framework in which we can conceptualise harm to non-
humans, rather than to the human beings whose interests they are created to serve. If we avoid making that mistake 
then we can see how adopting an information perspective, either as an initial ethical starting point to which an 
anthropocentric LoA is added or as in some sense supplementing that human perspective, adds nothing to our 
understanding of the wrong of a cyber attack. Focusing on the (potential) consequences to human interests of 
disruptions to particular critical infrastructure assets is sufficient and provides all the reason we need to resist IE's 
argument that there are 'no good reasons to stop anywhere but at the bottom'. We can stop where we need to stop.  
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constitute a casus belli. So there is good reason to think, as others have suggested51, that while 
Russia's cyber attacks on Estonia did not reach the level of a casus belli their attacks on Georgia a 
year later did, for instance. And we can make this judgement by comparing both the targets of 
the attacks and the severity of the disruption caused. If it turns out that in the future not many 
cyber attacks will ever meet the relevant threshold for being a non-violent casus belli then that is 
not an unfortunate outcome.  
 This raises the question of whether attacks on all critical infrastructure can potentially be 
considered a casus belli, especially as what counts as critical infrastructure does not only cover 
those assets which directly relate to the human interest in life and health. Alongside the 
Emergency Services, Defence Industrial Base, Healthcare and Public Health, and Food and 
Agriculture sectors, the US government also lists the Financial Services, Information Technology 
and Transportation Systems sectors. Each of these clearly have an important role to play in 
underpinning those sectors that more directly address the basic interests of human life; without a 
functioning banking system people would not have the money to buy food, without a working 
transport system the emergency services would cease to function, and so on. Yet for each of 
those sectors mentioned, the government's justification for their inclusion as critical 
infrastructure also refers to their vital social and economic functions. If we go back to the 
definitions of critical infrastructure offered earlier, it is important that the US includes 'national 
economic security' as an area of national life that critical infrastructure protects and services. And 
it is listed on equal terms alongside security and national public health or safety. The UK 
definition is even broader. It defines critical infrastructure in relation to those assets the 
disruption of which would cause severe economic, social or political disruption, again alongside 
the loss of human life but without giving any sense of priority among them. 
                                                          
51 For example, Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare 
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 There are two issues here: Can even severe economic, social or political disruption 
constitute a casus belli? And could a cyber attack ever cause such severe disturbance? On the first 
question, there is obviously significant ambiguity as to what aspects of our economic, social or 
political lives are pertinent here. While some people may be dependent (quite literally) on 
Facebook for much of their social interactions, we would not want to include any disruption to 
its services, no matter how severe, as a just cause for going to war (and that a Chatham House 
report even entertained this idea in relation to Google or Amazon is quite extraordinary.52 Again, 
few commentators have agreed with the Estonian Prime Minister that the cyber attacks they 
were victims of during their conflict with Russia amount to a just cause, even though they 
disrupted the ability of the government to communicate with its people. Likewise Senator John 
McCain's declaration that Russia's alleged interference in the 2016 US Presidential election 
amounted to an 'act of war' garnered little support, even though, if true, it may well be the case 
that Russia's involvement influenced the outcome.53 Matters might be a little clearer in regards to 
economic disruption, but maybe only at the very extreme. If a cyber attack had the same 
catastrophic effects on human life and misery as Walzer sets out in relation to economic 
blockades, then we may follow him in thinking that it does represent an aggressive act.54 But then 
imagine a cyber attack that, for instance, targeted the financial system and caused significant 
enough disruption, say through preventing electronic financial transactions, deleting bank 
account details, or corrupting information of capital holdings, to cost a national economy several 
billions (though today no national economy is completely isolated in this way). Would such an 
attack be deemed a just cause despite the fact that it does not cause physical harm? The answer 
to this is far from clear, though there is a prima facie case for thinking that it would insofar as such 
severe economic disruption would then have knock-on effects on almost all of the state's 
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national interests and those of its individual members. Whether such an attack is within the 
realms of plausibility is, however, a matter of some considerable dispute even among technical 
experts.55 So it is not quite clear what sort of credible economic, social or political disruption 
could qualify as a casus belli, though this may represent more of a failure of imagination as to the 
extent of the disruption a cyber attack can cause than be an indication of the inherent limitations 
of cyber weapons. 
 All of this admittedly adds a somewhat consequentialist flavour to just war theory as 
applied to cyber attacks which may look incongruent with how it has been traditionally 
understood. Yet it would probably be a mistake to think that just war theory gives no weight to 
consequentialist reasons at all. It clearly must allow us to discriminate between, say, the shooting 
of a bullet across a border and the launching of a nuclear missile, and it would seem that it is the 
varying likely consequences of these attacks that does the work in justifying our intuition that the 
former may constitute a casus belli (depending on who shot it, at what, whether anyone was hurt, 
and so on) whereas the latter does without question. And anyway there are good reasons for 
thinking that such consequentialist reasoning should feature prominently in relation to cyber 
attacks, and that is because we know that many states have been hacking and attempting to hack 
into each other's critical infrastructure for many years now (what Lucas calls 'state-sponsored 
hacktivism').56 Some of these have been discovered; it is reasonable to assume that there are 
many intrusions that have not been caught and which are ongoing. Even when such intrusions 
have been exposed it is very difficult to ascertain exactly what the perpetrators did while they had 
access to that system, whether they planted numerous 'logic bombs' to be 'detonated' at some 
strategic moment in the future, whether they exported critical data or altered significant 
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information, or whether they were just relatively innocently poking around the system. It would 
therefore be precipitous to think that the mere intrusion into a critical infrastructure's computer 
system represented a just cause. Rather we should view such activity as forms of espionage 
(which is not deemed to constitute a casus belli) until the point at which it is apparent that the 
intrusion was part of an attack that either causes severe disruption to that infrastructure or to 
make such disruption possible.  
 On a related point, the contemporary global situation today is characterised by a sort of 
ongoing but low-level cyber war, or maybe more accurately, a series of low-level cyber-
skirmishes between states. Some of these have been made public by governments themselves, 
like the Syrian Electronic Army's recent hack into the US army website or China's (alleged) 
intrusion into US federal government computers.57 Others, such as the (again alleged) cyber 
attack by the UK spy agency GCHQ on a Belgian telecom firm, have only come to light through 
leaks such as the 'Snowden Files'.58 Nevertheless, we can be certain that there is a lot more 
activity going on that we remain unaware of. War is such a terrible condition that it must be the 
aim of any ethical theory or legal framework to try and limit the circumstances in which it is 
justified to engage in conflict. If any cyber attack on a nation's critical infrastructure constituted a 
casus belli then the fact of the matter is that the international sphere would not be characterised by 
a Hobbesian state of nature but by a much worse situation in which the most powerful states 
would be facing each other all with right on their side. This would not limit warfare but provide a 
sort of universal just cause that all powerful states could claim as justification to go to war. The 
only way to avoid this unhappy picture is to think that the consequences of a cyber attack must 
have some role to play in our moral judgements of them. 
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Conclusion 
For all the hyperbole about how the distinctiveness of cyber attacks and conflicts in the cyber 
realm leaves just war theory 'in tatters', this paper has argued that, at least in the case of casus belli, 
the principles of just war theory can fairly straightforwardly be applied to the use of cyber 
weapons. The lesson we learnt from the failures of IE to provide a sufficient ethical framework 
for thinking about cyber attacks was that it is a mistake to think that we need to abandon the 
'human perspective' in order to adopt an ontological framework somehow better suited to the 
peculiarities of cyber conflict. Indeed, we found that those ontological features of cyber attacks 
that are often used as justification for why JWT is an outdated framework in need of an upgrade  
- that they are non-physical, target non-humans, and are non-violent - were either descriptively 
dubious claims to begin with or, more importantly, simply not pertinent. It is true that many - 
maybe most - cyber attacks will be non-violent. But we should accept the possibility that even a 
non-violent cyber attack can rise to the level of a casus belli if it is disruptive enough that it 
significantly harms vital human interests. This, admittedly, is an amendment to how the just 
cause principle in traditional just war theory has traditionally been interpreted. And we must also 
admit the greater weight of more consequentialist reasons than the traditional account allows. 
But, while important, I take these to be amendments that remain within traditional just war 
theory rather than require its abandonment and the re-founding of a new ethics of war more 
suited to the digital age. Indeed the broader point of this paper is that while the security 
environment in which we now find ourselves is radically different we ought nevertheless to 
reaffirm traditional just war theory, as paradoxical as that admittedly sounds.  
